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Introduction
This article is concerned with a more thorough integration of the human body into social
thinking. We argue that a practice–theoretical conceptualisation of bodies in action offers
a productive boundary object for different ways of knowing the body and a resource for
the social sciences to initiate co-laborations with other disciplines characterised by strong
interdisciplinarity (Sutton 2010).
The article takes up the recently developing interest in ‘practices’ in two research areas
of the natural sciences: neuroanthropology and epigenetics. Here, social, cultural and
bodily practices are seen as a promising perspective to design models of the interrelations
and interdependencies between environments and bodies. In the neurosciences, practices
are conceptualised as integrating perception, cognition and knowledge in action sequences,
dynamically situating and embedding ‘cognitive agents’ in their socio-cultural-natural
environments (Choudhury and Slaby 2012). Likewise, recent research in epigenetics
suggests that bodily practices, shaped by the social and material environments within
which they are performed, imprint a body that is understood to be highly susceptible to
past ‘experiences’ as well as changes in its social and material environments (Niewöh-
ner 2011). These notions of practice privilege process over event and gradual development
or evolution over instant change and are interested in feed-back as well as feed-forward
loops between bodies and their material and social environments.
While these theoretical developments in some innovative branches of the natural
sciences are captivating, it is open to question how to bring about a fruitful conversation
with approaches to the study of practices in the social sciences. One of the obstacles—as
will be argued by taking social anthropology as an example—is a conspicuous weakness
of social science concepts, namely that they tend(ed) to black box the ‘physical’ body
(Benton 1991; Newton 2007). Another obstacle is that conceptualisations of practice
in the natural sciences, more often than not, tend to ‘flatten’ the social to immediate
interactions or the cultural is reduced to an often ethnocentric understanding of norms
and rules that are applied in decision making (Henrich 2005; Henrich et al. 2010).
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Praxeological Perspectives in Anthropology
For sociocultural anthropology, practice theory affords several benefits that enable it to
serve as a bridging concept and overcome these obstacles. Anthropologists as well as
ethnographically minded sociologists were among the first propagators and practitioners
of practice theory (Bourdieu 1979; Ortner 1984). This perspective takes the materiality
of human environments systematically into account (Pickering 1995; Reckwitz 2002);
through concepts such as ‘embodiment’, it brings the body as a resource, site and
repository of experienced action (Csordas 1990; Lock 1993; Desjarlais and Throop 2011)
as well as emotion into the focus of analyses (Cowan 1990; Wilce 2004); it affords
observational systematics that de-privileges the individual and instead stresses the
shared-ness, collectivity and potential creativity of action (Rabinow 1996; Turner 2006).
Moreover, practice theory includes, at least implicitly, a theory of learning, remembering,
forgetting and unlearning that is not brain-o-centric (Lave 1985; Lave and Wenger
1991; Turner 2001). It can be argued that practice theory takes ‘time’ seriously as
a sociocultural category in a threefold sense: as a cultural construct (Elias, Evans
Pritchard and Joas), as a reminder of the historicity of human action (A. Giddens and
R. Bernstein) and as a biographical dimension of subjects in contexts. Generally, practice
theory is refreshingly anti-mentalistic (Schmidt 2012, p. 57) and focuses on processes and
performances (Barad 2003), much to the liking of sociocultural anthropologists. Especially
in fields such as medical anthropology and anthropology of learning or performance,
variants of practice theories are firmly established since the 1980s—a rather successful
mainstreaming of praxeological approaches.
Closely examining praxeological accounts, the body in anthropology and even more so
the social sciences is often treated as a black box—a black box that accomplishes a diverse
set of crucial tasks. Experiences are embodied or somatised, skills are accumulated,
dispositions are encultured, habits are formed and ‘hysteresis effects’ (Bourdieu 1979)
guarantee that (re–)actions towards the social and natural environments are relatively
stable and reproducible over time while providing room for variation, adaptability and
creativity. However, how ‘the body’ manages all this or how the internal organisation of
bodies in combination with its material-discursive environments affords the orderliness of
practices remains mysterious. Anthropological as well as sociological analyses stop at the
skin. What is beyond is left to the natural sciences; it remains by and large unexplored
how the social or the cultural goes under the skin and ‘into’ the body (Niewöhner et al.
2008) or how bodily characteristics shape (inter)actions.
This superficiality in social scientific engagement with the world and human bios is
reproduced at the level of theory and indeed epistemontology (Barad 2007). Social
sciences, according to the established consensus, are concerned with people. They
are decidedly dys-concerned with humans (Faßler 2014)—a field for rather speculative
anthropological philosophy. Any substantial contribution to and involvement in material-
semiotic practices is largely left to the human sciences (biology and neuroscience, medicine
and parts of psychology, molecular and evolutionary thinking in various disciplines), as
is referred to by Ian Hacking, a historian of science. There are many reasons for this
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established division of labour. One of the more prominent is, as cultural anthropologist
Anna Tsing rightly states, that biology is still seen by many in the social sciences
as the enemy of critical thought (Tsing 2000). While there are many good reasons
for sociocultural sciences to remain firmly on the side of ‘the social’ in this Cartesian
universe, in anthropology, particularly in fields such as medical anthropology, this is not
a satisfying option.
Why is this the case? There are two main reasons. First, anthropology is a comparative
venture, studying humans in diverse socio-cultural-material environments, past and
present. It analyses humans in their universality as well as their (local) specificity.
More precisely, it has to understand what is universal to analyse the specifics of social
interaction in places as diverse as metropolitan neighbourhoods and Sumatran highlands.
Second, humans have diseases and feel ill. Disease (a matter of a physiological fact) and
illness (a matter of a culturally impregnated concern) may be analytically disentangled,
but out in the world they interact, loop and it makes little sense to study them apart from
each other. ‘People’ suffer very differently from diseases that infect humans (Zola 1966).
Similarly with theories of social interaction; social inquiry does well at describing and
analysing patterns of interaction in groups of people and understanding how that helps
produce quotidian life as meaningful for those involved. Yet, it is so consumed with
this level of analysis that the physiological and environmental elements contributing or
participating in this interaction are ignored (see Linde 1972; König 1984), as are the
contributions on longer-term time scales provided by evolutionary change in the patterns
of cooperation and adaptation (Durham 1991).
This is, of course, an age-old problem and we do not suggest that we will solve it
here. Rather we make three brief points pertaining to the method and epistemology that
might help practice theory fulfil some of its potential in becoming a post-Cartesian way
of engaging with an embodied world:
• The hinterlands of practices: we should be more positive about studying matter
beyond its immediately given surface. In addition to matters of fact or concern,
we should analyse the matters of effect(ing)—such as infrastructures, bodies or
environments.
• Practices beyond the actual: we should think more carefully about the source and
nature of continuities and ruptures between the sets of practices. What connects or
couples practices? When practices exhibit ordering effects, what attunes different
practices to one another? Practices unfold in an extended present. Yet, recent
molecular biological research demonstrates how material bodies are embedded in
different time scales. What are the affordances of such embedded bodies and what
does this mean for social theories of reproduction and ordering?
• Embodied minds: we ought to revisit theories of communication, interaction,
cognition and learning in the light of recent findings in sociocultural neurosciences.
How do we conceptualise cognition in practice theory?
3
Hinterlands of Practices
Praxiography, and perhaps ethnography in general, is good at observing ongoing things.
It is a largely vision-based form of interaction that is particularly suited to record things
interfacing with other things. Stefan Hirschauer has rightly argued the term praxioscopic
methods (Hirschauer 2010), because eyes are the primary devices and looking is the
predominant practice in standard ethnography. Much has been written about perspective
and ‘scopic regimes’ (Jay 1988). The fact that we can only look from a particular
standpoint has been discussed in its epistemic and ethical implications and nothing more
needs to be said about it here.
Of lesser interest has been the fact that the human gaze (note: human gaze, not people
looking) stops at hard surfaces, for example, skin or walls, or that the human gaze is
rather bad at observing slow, extended, incremental processes. While this may provide a
welcome reduction of complexity in fieldwork, it is also potentially a severe limitation
when trying to understand practices. Take any degenerative disease and it becomes
immediately obvious that much of what is implicated in changing practices happens
incrementally under a person’s skin. It seems to us that it would be helpful to know
something about what is happening there. Praxioscopic approaches at least in a simple
meaning fall short here, when ‘seeing’ is understood in an ‘unmediated’ sense. A slowly
progressing, degenerative disease is a drastic example, but the principle holds for any
type of human (inter)action: it unfolds on different scales, from the microscopic to the
macroscopic, and the immediate, observable present is nothing more than an event in an
extended, uneven process. The argument here is not about determinism. No one in their
right mind would argue that human interaction or practices are generally determined by
bios, let alone biology. Yet, it seems more acceptable to argue that human interaction or
practices can be understood through history, culture and human agency. While this may
be an enlightened position and politically important in many contexts it seems equally
improbable. Therefore, it is dissatisfying to write about material-semiotic practices or
sociotechnical networks or sociomaterial ontology and still rely on praxioscopic methods
using only the ‘natural senses’.
This argument is even more applicable to a renewed interest in multi-sensory methods.
Particularly scholars in anthropology advocate a multi-sensory approach to fieldwork.
Hearing, smelling, touching, tasting and seeing practices combined seem superior to just
‘gazing’. As ethnography is always an embodied interaction, we might as well pay analytic
attention to our other senses. Yet again, much of this work, and it is not all that much
as yet, goes about using the human senses without reflecting their capabilities in any
meaningful sense. Multi-sensory anthropology is often done without the anthropology
of the senses. What sensory anthropology without a critical anthropology of the senses
often leads to is an unreflexive engagement with the ‘world’ or ‘field’, with all senses
to be more involved in different ways, closer and more engaged. Such polemic is highly
unfair to a lot of good work in this area. Yet our point remains: if we understand the
human senses as interfaces with a complex physiological and cognitive hinterland as well
as with a media-rich deployment zone of human action, it becomes easier to understand
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human interaction not simply as intersubjectivity or an interface, but as the complex
interaction of two or more systems with considerable depth.
To know these physiological and cognitive hinterlands as well as the mediated nature
of all senses, then becomes an important element of understanding embodied practices.
Note that we are not arguing that these hinterlands can be known in any definite sense
or represented in any objective fashion. Our knowledge of the hinterlands remains
historically and socially contingent. Bios and logos are both necessarily and always
situated.
Finally, the implicit authenticity so often carried in multi-sensory anthropology also
implies a type of direct contact between people: unmediated access to the world and
fellow humans. For anthropology past the ‘writing-culture-debate’ and more than
reflexive in many ways, this is untenable. Just the opposite approach seems much more
fruitful. Particularly in fields such as urban anthropology or STS, the anthropologist
or ethnographer often moves in familiar terrain: western metropolitan areas, clinics or
factories are not all that strange. Hence, estrangement is an important technique: make
yourself strange or even ‘other’ to the familiar surroundings to produce difference in
engagement and generate a comparative and thus epistemic moment. Using methods
and technologies to do so seems only logical. Why be in the world unmediated when you
can use the systematic comparison of methodically and technologically mediated ways of
being in the world as a way of producing different modes of ‘worlding’ (e. g. Tsing 2010)?
Speaking with Don Ihde, we may discuss ‘post-phenomenological’ praxiography (2009).
Particularly, when significantly embodied practices are concerned, using technology to
mediate access to and analysis of these practices seems productive. As for medical
technologies, few of us are trained to use them and perhaps ‘endoscopic ethnography’ is
not such a clever idea. Yet engaging more systematically and more co-laboratively with
medical practices seems a plausible way of engaging with the embodied hinterland of
practices (Niewöhner 2015). Or one could get involved, as we have, in neuroscientific
experimental work to study cerebral involvement in human interaction (Kuhlen et al.
2012). We do not mean to be naïve about this. Of course, findings from different levels
and modes of analysis are not readily integrated into a coherent story. A somehow
more comprehensive theory of socio-material interaction cannot and must not be the
objective. Electric signals from a region of the brain when a person interacts with a
video interface tell us little about how people deal with each other in meaningful ways in
real life situations. Yet, we insist on the ethos of ‘praxiography beyond the skin’ as a
methodological call to attention that ought to follow recent theoretical developments in
this area and as a productive irritant against complacent socio-historical reductionism.
Practices Beyond the Actual
How do practices connect with each other? We often speak of routines, habitus, patterns
and orders to point out that practices connect with each other in persistent, systematic
ways. They become structurally coupled or form a set. The question we are asking is
how is this connection maintained? How is continuity provided between two practices?
How is this relationship between different practices ordered?
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In anthropology, this is an old question that was asked for the first time with con-
siderable force by a group of anthropologists around Max Gluckman in Manchester in
the 1940s and 1950s (Burawoy 1998; Evens 2006). Structural functionalism was in full
flow and this group of anthropologists became dissatisfied with the way empirical data
was being used only in illustrative means to support a particular theory of social order.
They argued that social situations do not occur as isolated incidences. They are always
integrated into a flow of practices. They have a before and after. Extracting them as
individual situations or cases to illustrate a particular theoretical understanding of social
order seemed increasingly problematic. Gluckman and others carefully analysed the
ethnographies of the time to find that in a significant number of cases the analysis had
only been possible in the ways it had been done, because the anthropologist deliberately
ignored the fact that the actors implicated in the particular case knew each other well and
had interacted in significant ways many times preceding the situation at hand. Gluckman
was particularly unhappy about the fact that the structural functionalist framing of such
analyses emphasised social order over and against conflict.
The group responded to this dissatisfaction by developing what came to be known
in anthropology and beyond as the ‘extended case method’. In its core, the extended
case method means analysing situations in great ethnographic detail, but not as isolated
phenomena but as a series of situations over time. Crucial to this way of performing
ethnography was the continuity or connectivity between the situations provided by people.
Situations were analysed in series, because some of the actors appeared in several or all of
them, albeit in significantly different configurations. Situations as static events acquired
a temporal extension—analyses focused not yet on process but on change over time.
The extended case method, as proposed by the Manchester School, considered social
structure to be highly dynamic and ‘the social’ appeared to them not to be a matter of
the normative but the result of conflicting, ongoing processes of norming (Evens 2006,
p. 50).
Our interest here lies in the fact that the extended case method analyses individual
social situations in context or series. The analysis of practices faces an analogous
problem: how do we isolate practices from the continuous flow of quotidian life and make
connections between practices? To the Manchester school, the answer was simple: the
same people occur in different situations—this is a meaningful link and we must analyse
them together to avoid a situational bias. The field provided continuity across practices
through actors. This notion of the actor analytically foregrounds the individual as a
carrier of social capacities—meaning making, social interaction and communication—and
as a participant in social structure.
We argue that practice theory ought to relate to this tradition of analysing the
production of continuity, yet do not follow the Manchester School into their notion of the
actor. Rather we suggest that a significant element of continuity may be hiding from social
analysis in the material part of material-semiotic practice. Bodies and infrastructures
are but two matters of concern with a tendency towards stability and lag. Bodies are not
simply surfaces, but inert hosts to subjects or storage spaces for knowledge and culture.
Bodies in their multiple hinterlands and beyond the skin are embedded within multiple
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spatial and temporal contexts. Recent work in molecular biology has made remarkable
advances in problematising the skin-bound, cognition-led body of homo oeconomicus
in favour of a body that is heavily impregnated by its experiences and multiple spatial
and temporal horizons. There is no space here to delve into the details of research
on epigenetics and the molecular biology of social position (see Niewöhner 2011, 2015;
Landecker 2011; Landecker and Panofsky 2013; Pickersgill et al. 2013). It suffices to
say that recent research is demonstrating remarkably sensitive molecular and cellular
mechanisms responding to changes in an organism’s social and material environments.
These mechanisms produce altered patterns of gene regulation and expression and exhibit
stability across cell division and possibly across generations. Thus, the question arises
within molecular biology as to how an organism is situated within a community and how
that situatedness conditions the body beyond the affected generation. This question
is not new, for neither biology nor social science. Yet, in biology, the question now
arises of mechanism and stability over time, that is, heritability and transmission, and
as such, it is new in biology and social science alike. If bodies are in relevant ways
embedded within evolutionary, intergenerational and biographical, interactional and real
metabolic or physiological time, it seems reasonable to assume that these different time
horizons (and indeed time economies) provide different affordances for the production
of continuity across practices. Our bodies, and a similar argument can be made for
infrastructures, afford changes in practices in various ways and on multiple scales. It
seems prudent to recognise the materiality of the body, know it in different ways and
theorise its contributions to the development of patterns of practice. There is no reason
to believe that the processes of reproduction and ordering are not shaped to some degree
by material agency not easily known through methods trained to the visual and semiotic
only.
Extended/Embodied Minds in Practices
Our third point returns to the question of the beginning and end of practices, how we
identify them at all and how we as observers and actors mutually understand practices
in interaction—the ‘we-mode’ of practices (Gallotti and Frith 2013). These questions
are especially relevant in the context of recent debates in the neurosciences that try to
revise Cartesian or computational concepts of cognition, increasingly held to be overly
psychologised, detached from the situated body as well as the environment. According to
these approaches, cognition should be socialised and culturalised rather than psychologised;
and these concepts of cognitive processes and mind fundamentally challenge dominant
western philosophical speculations about reason and thinking (Lakoff and Johnson 1999).
What is interesting is that this reconceptualisation opens up the debate about cognition
from a ‘genetic perspective’—genetic in the sense of Norbert Elias’ ‘cultural genesis’, not
James D. Watson’s and Francis Crick’s molecular genetics. We argue that these debates
are not only of great interest for any social science analysis of practices, but that an
evolved praxeological perspective can inform these debates in the neurosciences.
There are two lines of research in the neurosciences that complement each other and
take as their problem either how a mind is embodied or extends into the socio-cultural-
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material environment. While there is a great deal of diversity in conceptualising the
‘embodied mind’ (Wilson 2002), proponents agree in rejecting a purely computational
model of cognition and instead favour a perspective where cognition is seen as an integral
part of embodied, learned action in culturally shaped and shared environments (Varela
et al. 1991; Hutchins 1995, 2008). This concept resonates with praxeological accounts
in the social sciences in that it stresses ‘knowing how’, doing and intervening over
‘knowing that’, representing and computing. It emphasises embodied skills over abstract
representations (Reckwitz 2003). However, this perspective adds to social science accounts
of practices a concern about how evolutionary processes shaped human physiology into
which cognition is embodied or embedded. It asks how culture and (social) practices
reconfigure ‘the use patterns of the brain’ (Donald 1991, p. 14; Tomasello 2002), linking
human biological evolution and human cultural history in a fashion that allows to
reconcile the obvious biological unity of mankind with findings that show diversities in
actual cognitive structures shaped by culturally diverse practices—be it speaking different
languages (Vogeley and Roepstorff 2009) or learning to dance Capoeira (Downey 2012).
Here, culture is thought to go ‘under the skin’ and ‘into the brain’ (Niewöhner et al.
2008), suggesting cross-cultural research methods for inquiries into neurological plasticity
that might provide an antidote to essentialism, both universal and particular (Lende and
Downey 2012).
This deep historical dimension is even more pronounced in the postulate of an ‘extended
mind’. According to this perspective, human skin does not encapsulate cognitive processes.
Instead, cognitive acts are held to be distributed across a historically accumulated
cognitive equipment that is intra-bodily only to a degree: be it symbols, language and
metaphors, instruments, tools and media from cave walls to notebooks and computers.
Accordingly, the human mind is conceptualised as ‘a leaky organ, forever escaping its
‘natural’ confines and mingling shamelessly with body and the world’ (Clark 1997, p. 53).
The fruitfulness of this perspective was demonstrated in a seminal ethnographic study
by Edwin Hutchins, analysing how the practice of ship navigation is distributed across
many specialists and artefacts (e. g. maps and measuring devices), orchestrated by a
highly sophisticated social organisation into a complex, choreographed set of practices
(Hutchins 1995). According to this perspective, cognition does not have a solid base
in the scull but is distributed across space and time and across a heterogeneous set of
equipment (from biological to symbolic ‘matter’)—it is enacted by cognitive practices.
Both perspectives, the embodied mind as well as the extended mind thesis, define prac-
tices as the proper epistemic object of cognitive studies. Accordingly, the neurosciences
might enter into a mode where any explanation of cognitive phenomena necessarily
comprises sociocultural phenomena. This has far reaching consequences for the received
theoretical furnishings of all implicated disciplines—be it the social sciences, philosophy or
the natural sciences—as well as the established modes of knowledge production through
unmediated observation (in the social sciences and ethnography) or laboratory experimen-
tation in the psy- and neuro-disciplines (Beck 2013). If cognition has to be understood
as an emergent phenomenon brought about by heterogeneously equipped, historically
and situationally diverse practices, a praxeological account seems to be imminent to
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overcome the individualistic, brain-o-centric bias in the neurosciences. What is at stake
here can be illuminated taking a recent paper on ‘social cognition’ by neuroscientists
Mattia Gallotti and Chris D. Frith as an example (Gallotti and Frith 2013).
Gallotti and Frith rightly analyse the persisting difficulties of individualistic theories
of mind to plausibly explain interaction. According to the classical approach, each of the
interacting individuals has to engage in ‘mindreading’—that is, ascribing mental states
to the other— to grasp her intentions. As a precondition for interaction, mindreading is
based on observation and abstract cognition of observed ‘facts’ in the minds of each actor.
Yet, this is hardly a plausible assumption. Obviously, ‘when interacting, agents appear to
have access to more information about the behaviour of their partners than they would
have as mere observers in a disembodied social context’ (ibid., p. 160). Yet, instead of
addressing ‘shared action’ or ‘shared practices’, the authors take a different tack, still true
to the psychological heritage of the neuro-sciences. They postulate a ‘shared intentionality’
as they formulate ‘a striking feature of the psychology of collective intentional behaviour
[is . . . ] that joint action involves shared or collective or ‘we-intentions” (ibid., p. 162).
They call this ‘social cognition in the we-mode’. Their explanation, however, remains
overly idealistic and still presupposes a ‘theory of mind’ (if even a type of ‘we-mind’)
applied by all actors.
That interaction presupposes a theorising of mind from all actors is, from a praxe-
ological perspective, at the same time too much and too little. If instead interaction
is conceptualised as participation in shared practices, what is needed is not an overly
sophisticated theory of mind but a proper understanding of the course of a practice (this
is, less theorising), unfolding in a specific environment and situation; hence, a theory
of practice that is informed by practical (tacit or explicit) first-person knowledge (this
is, more knowledge than observation alone will provide). The larger part of everyday
interactions is of a type that simply does not require any sophisticated mind games, which
inquire into the intentions of others. Gilbert Ryle’s famous example of a boy winking
and the interpretive steps necessary to sort out whether he suffers from a nervous tick
or tries to communicate a secret message problematises meaning making and the use
of (natural) symbols in communication (Ryle 1968). This is an extreme case of interac-
tion—and it is unfortunate that Clifford Geertz based his sociocultural hermeneutics,
his ‘thick description’, on this example (Geertz 1973). Yet, it is even more unfortunate
that Geertz succeeded in establishing his mode of ‘thick description’, to inquire into
the hidden cultural meanings of interaction, as the dominant mode of explanation in
many ethnographic studies. What is needed, instead, is an even ‘thicker description’,
one that inquires into enacted meaning as well as enacted skills, taking into account
enacted symbolic systems and enacted infrastructures and embodiment as well as means
for extended cognition.
Methodological Consequences
The methodological consequences of these challenges are manifold. We sketch only four
aspects here:
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• Praxiographic research requires a fundamental broadening of perspective and an
additional basic unit of analysis. Social sciences are primarily concerned with human
action, ‘handeln’ in various descriptions, but almost always grounded in a cognitive
agent (i. e. a thinking human individual) or a social agent (i. e. an individual
interacting with other humans). We have tried to argue in favour of a focus on the
infrastructural conditions of practices. The peripheral role of the material-technical
con-dicere of practices, elementary to sociology, might be productively challenged
in such a manner. This contradicts the deep-seated western-modern and largely
implicit intuition that the social is primarily characterised by human interaction:
‘The coincidence of the social order with the pattern of relations between human
beings is taken for granted’ (Luckmann 1970, p. 73).
• Historian of science Geoffrey Bowker speaks of ‘infrastructural inversion’ to empha-
sise a new type of explanatory reasoning in the history of science that performs
a Gestalt switch: the genesis and development of facts is not primarily rooted in
social and cognitive processes, but to various degrees also embedded in the much
less visible and often boring organisational–infrastructural conditions of scientific
practice (Bowker and Star 1999). A prime example is the decrease of mortal-
ity during the 19th century, which had less to do with improvements in medical
diagnosis and therapy and much more with state-driven structural measures to
improve general hygiene in urban environments—less heroic Hippocratic action,
more infrastructural transformation. (Although to be fair, social and health policy,
statistics and medicine in the 1850s were not easily separated.)
• Parsons once remarked that removing the ‘hyphen’ from psycho-somatic would
require a fundamental revision of medical and biological core concepts established
in the 19th and early 20th century (Parsons 1991, p. 290). The same applies to
social science perspectives: we are still not there yet. Methodologically, the social
sciences have been notorious in neglecting the infrastructural conditions of their
own research. Incremental, long-term socio-material change, as is typical for many
embodied practices not only in the field of health and illness, requires a detail in
description that the ethnographic individual—still the hallmark of anthropological
research—cannot deliver if she relies on ‘natural senses’ only. Carefully severing some
of the ties between individual and empirical material will be necessary to develop
forms of team-ethnography and data infrastructures that enable cross-individual
analysis without jeopardising too much of ethnographic thickness. Anthropology
can draw on a substantial but largely forgotten history of long-term field sites and
longitudinal data collection (Niewöhner 2014). Developing the analytical measures
to handle such data is an important task.
• Anthropologist Paul Rabinow has argued that ‘thickness’ is located differently
today (Rabinow et al. 2008). We take this to mean that human activity is not
only suspended in webs of meaning, but it unfolds in embodied practices and
material environments. Thickness in inquiry can thus not simply be achieved by
looking over actors’ shoulders. It is not based on meaning-making strategies in
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an intersubjective sense. Instead, practices draw on and enact bodies and build
environments, natures and technologies. Hence, thick inquiry requires at least three
steps: (a) The praxioscopic analysis of social interaction and an explication of the
tacit ethnographic knowledge contained in this analysis, that is, the embodied and
material contributions to this interaction (b) These contributions are commonly
known by other disciplines and their respective methods. Understanding these
approaches is necessary. The result is a multitude of related thin descriptions. ‘Re-
lated’ does not mean that these individual thin descriptions add up to some kind of
comprehensive description. The complicated relationality of thin descriptions would
ideally be represented in some type of new ‘notational system’ (Bateson 1941, 1971).
(c) These multiple thin descriptions then form the basis for co-laborative ‘thick-
ening’. ‘Co-laboration’ here means temporary, non-teleological, shared epistemic
work that does not pursue integration of findings, but the production of critical
reflexivity from discussions of thin descriptions (Niewöhner 2015, 2016). ‘Thickness’
in Rabinow’s sense then does not stem from the local webs of meaning and it is not
located in the individual mind of the anthropologist. Rather thickness is located
within a distributed process of epistemic work that involves multiple methods and
ways of being in the world. It might take the form of a parasite (Marcus 2000)
and it might try different forms of experimental entanglement (Fitzgerald and
Callard 2014). In any case, joint and interdisciplinary data production, analysis
and publication between social and material specialists are rare. This will in the
long run also require a new understanding and practice of the relationship between
theory and the empiric (Hirschauer 2008; Schmidt 2012).
Conclusion
Praxiography is exceptionally good at looking at things being done and it has made
significant inroads into incorporating materiality into analyses of social life and indeed
social ontologies (Schatzki et al. 2001). However, the analytical step of providing prac-
tices with an environment—that is, defining the relevant ‘contexts’ for the observed
practices, be they social circumstances or bodily conditions—needs a bit more theoretical
and methodological effort. Praxiography is exceptionally good at analysing bodies in
action. Yet, it usually refrains from extending its analyses beyond the skin. We have
argued that praxiography might benefit from insights and recent debates about ‘social
position’ or ‘cultural cognition’ in the sciences. We think that these debates in turn
might profit from praxeological explanations of everyday (inter)action. Different ways of
knowing the body—sociological, anthropological, biological and neuroscientific—should
enter into dialogue around bodies in action as shared objects of analysis. Human co-
existence (Schatzki 2010) in this sense becomes known through multiple, co-laborative
ways of knowing practices and the object of a new type of thick inquiry. To make this
conversation between the social and natural sciences fruitful, a mode of ‘strong interdis-
ciplinarity’—where the modes of inquiry and modes of explanation in all participating
disciplines are transformed—seems necessary. An extended theory of practices considering
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insights from, for example, sociology, anthropology and the neurosciences might be a
good starting point to generate preliminary hypotheses for such a co-laborative venture.
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